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Introduction
Two AF F-15s above the East China Sea, conducting Basic Fighter Maneuver and air refueling training, are awaiting a rejoin with the remaining flight members when distraction leads to a mid-air collision; both pilots safely eject but the jets crash into the sea. An Army M1240 M-ATV, with an inexperienced operator and three passengers, approaches an unfamiliar river crossing. During the crossing the vehicle is overcome by the river forces and overturns; all personnel are lost and the vehicle is heavily damaged. An off-duty Marine, while riding his motorcycle on a winding road loses control, crashes, destroys the bike, and incurs major injuries.
What is the commonality among each of these unrelated events? They are all examples of DOD and U.S. military service reportable "on/off-duty" mishaps. 1 Due to the importance of mishap prevention, the services maintain professional safety staffs to identify hazards, address root causes of mishaps, and provide strategies to mitigate or eliminate mishaps. Evolution of investigative procedures, coupled with the need to compile and collate data for analysis, led to the development of separate mishap data collection and reporting systems (referred to as safety data system(s) from this point forward) within the services. The problem is these systems are stovepiped, service-specific, and have little to no linkage or standardization among them. This lack of interoperability makes it difficult to efficiently collect, collate, or compare comprehensive hazard and mishap data within and across the services. System differences, coupled with non-standardized data fields, create delays in cross-service data analysis, trending, and implementation of mishap mitigation strategies. In addition, current fiscal realities, coupled with federal policies focused on streamlining government operations, as well as reducing duplicative IT systems, are driving the DOD and military services to improve processes to save time, resources and manpower. A background review of why, what and how mishap data is collected, coupled with a macro view of current safety data systems, a discussion of the challenges of future development strategies, and the future vision of capabilities and cost effectiveness of a single joint safety data system will clearly illustrate the AF Safety Automated System (AFSAS) is the system of choice for the joint-service safety data system.
BACKGROUND Why mishap data is collected
Over the past 50 years, technological advances, improved systems, and better reliability in hardware have contributed to significant reductions in overall mishaps and mishap rates. However, despite these improvements, we have not found a way to effectively engineer human factors out of the equation when it comes to mishaps. As an example, it is estimated 67% of AF aviation related mishaps as well as 85% of ground related mishaps are directly related to human factor failures; not mechanical anomalies. 3 In an effort to identify the hazards and the root causes for these mishaps, the military services take great efforts to investigate these accidents, gather data, and analyze the findings to mitigate or eliminate causes where possible. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6055.07, Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping, 6 June 2011, establishes the requirements for safety and occupational health data collection and reporting. 4 The instruction applies across all DOD components, and its purpose is to "Protect DOD property from damage and DOD personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational illness" as well as "Protect the public from the risk of death, injury, illness, or property damage because of DOD activities. 12 In 2008, the SIMWG increased the number of common data elements to 118, to meet the safety needs across DOD and OSHA. 13 The SIMWG is currently reviewing this list and expects the number of fields to reduce once the services come to a consensus on the final list; however, there is currently no projected timeline for this change. Beyond strict mishap related and human factors data collection, the services also track hazard data not directly associated with mishaps or injury. This precursor data is important for effective risk management in conjunction with proactive mishap prevention.
Each military service also manages formal risk management (RM), risk assessment programs, safety inspection programs, and hazard abatement programs contributing to the safety awareness and well-being of their personnel. 14 Although these programs provide effective processes for RM and safety awareness, they are not integrated with the safety data collection systems of their respective service.
How mishap data is collected
Collection of mishap data is accomplished in multiple ways across the services, but Health Manual. 15 Additionally, the services breakdown reporting and investigation procedures into the respective functional areas: Afloat, Aviation, Ground, Weapons, etc. Service-specific publications provide guidance and procedures associated with mishaps in each area.
Despite specific differences in investigative process, there are essentially three primary ways mishap reporting is accomplished across all of the services: direct reporting of mishaps to safety personnel via phone calls, authorized forms or hand written reports turned in to safety offices for action, or through direct entry of mishap data into the safety data system. Regardless of how it is reported, once a mishap report is received and validated, all required information is entered into the service's safety data system for future review, analysis, and trending.
Unfortunately, there is little standardization amongst the services on the collection processes for mishap data, and in many cases functional areas and/or specific hazard data bases are stovepiped making collation and comparison difficult.
MACRO VIEW: CURRENT SAFETY DATA SYSTEMS
Note:
The following overview of current safety data systems assumes all are compliant with federal and DOD security requirements.
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Army
The U.S. Army (USA) currently utilizes the Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS) as its primary repository for all USA reportable accidents and associated data.
ASMIS is locally hosted at the Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center (USACR/SC) on centralized servers. It is a Common Access Card (CAC) accessible system closed to the general public. Access by other service users and safety professionals is approved on a case-by-case basis via ASMIS gatekeepers only. All primary data entry to this system is made by assigned personnel at the USACR/SC as transcribed from formal reports and forms available at their website. 17 In all cases, Army safety investigators utilize these forms to report and document mishap information. Once complete, they forward the forms to the USACR/SC for processing and entry into ASMIS; currently, there is no direct field entry of investigative data into ASMIS.
This inefficient practice leads to delays in the timely update of mishap data into the ASMIS database.
Also linked to ASMIS, and hosted on the USACR/SC homepage, is the Army's webbased Risk Management Information System (RMIS). RMIS allows approved users to conduct searches on reported mishaps (Class A-D, ground on/off-duty Class A-E, aviation) to obtain risk and hazard reports broken down by "age, grade, equipment, and additional fields. 18 The RMIS provides "Excel" type data retrieval only with no ability to conduct advanced mishap data analysis reporting, graphing or comparisons.
In addition, there is a third opportunity, the web-based Army accident reporting system, called "ReportIt," hosted on the USACR/SC. Mandated for use in FY12, ReporIt, "was created to assist the Army in meeting its requirements in AR 385-10, to capture all military, civilian, and contractor incidents and report/record those incidents within a centralized repository." 19 Per the site, ReporIt was implemented to address problems of under-reporting of mishaps and events.
The application requires CAC approval to access and utilizes a "Turbo-Tax" type interface to guide users through the report submission process only. The interface is strictly for reporting and does not provide any data query, retrieval, or analysis capability.
Air Force
The AF utilizes the web-based AF Safety Automated System (AFSAS) as its primary repository for all AF reportable accidents and associated data. On 28 March 2014, AFSAS migrated from centralized servers hosted at AFSEC to a commercial cloud, Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) environment. It is a CAC accessible system closed to the general public. Access by other service safety professionals is approved on a case-by-case basis via AFSAS approved gatekeepers. Data entry into this system is made directly by authorized safety professionals, mishap investigators, and occupational health & safety professionals through online entry only; no third party transcription is conducted at AFSEC for the field users. Although AF mishap reporting forms are available as required on the AFSEC webpage or the AF electronic publications site, all AF mishaps and reportable personal injuries are documented directly on-line via AFSAS whenever possible.
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AFSAS is a one-stop application for Class A-E mishap reporting across all disciplines, with "Turbo-Tax" type entry. The system provides the means to document all required Safety Investigation Board (SIB) Tabs and information within the system for Quality Control, review, approval, and final release by appropriate convening authority personnel. The system also provides authorized users the ability to search documented mishaps, create individual ad-hoc queries, conduct detailed comparative analysis, as well as produce graphs and charts via data extraction and business intelligence tools imbedded within the AFSAS application. In addition, occupational health specialists have separate and distinct AFSAS account access to query occupational illness investigations, produce occupational illness reports, and/or automated OSHA 300 and 300A reports within the AFSAS report tab as required.
Navy & Marines
The U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corp (USMC) utilize the Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) as their primary repository for all USN and USMC reportable accidents and associated data. WESS is locally hosted at the Naval Safety Center (NAVCEN) via centralized servers. WESS is a CAC accessible system closed to the general public. Access by other service safety professionals is approved on a case-by-case basis via WESS gatekeepers only. Primary data entry to the system is via a "Turbo-Tax" style interface by authorized field personnel when accessible; however, due to connectivity issues related to "Afloat" or disconnected contingency operations, electronic entry is not always possible. In these cases, investigative personnel are directed to utilize Naval Operations (OPNAV) forms 3750/59 through 69, to document mishap information for aviation related mishaps. Subsequently, these forms are forwarded via email to the designated authority directed in OPNAVINST 3750.6S, for input into the WESS Aviation
Mishap and Hazard Reporting System (WAMHRS). 21 For non-aviation related mishaps, users have the option to use the off-line WESS disconnected system (WESS-DS) via email or to submit a report using the naval message format directed in OPNAVINST 5102.1D. 22 In these cases, NAVCEN personnel enter the data into WESS for action, future reference, and analysis.
The Navy's Enterprise Safety Applications Management System (ESAMS) is a separate web-based, CAC enabled system for reporting minor occupational safety and health (OSH) related events. ESAMS reports are forwarded to the NAVCEN for review and, if determined to be anything other than minor OSH events, get kicked back to the submitter for entry into WESS.
ESAMS allows the Navy to comply with OSHA and OSH reporting requirements.
Coast Guard
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) utilizes "e-MISHAPS" for all reportable non-aviation (Afloat & Ashore) mishaps and "e-AVIATRS" for reportable aviation mishaps. These two applications provide the primary repository for all USCG reportable accidents and associated data. These applications are locally hosted by the USCG via centralized servers. The systems are web-based, password protected but non-CAC enabled for access. Access is controlled by USCG gatekeepers; but, the site is accessible to the general public. Although the USCG has a mishap report form (CG-5584, U.S. Coast Guard Mishap Report), there is no guidance in COMDTINST M5100.47A for its use in the event the web-based systems are unavailable.
DOD
The DOD has a single system acting as a gathering point for the services common data elements for mishap information. This system, referred to as the Force Risk Reduction (FR2) database, is maintained by the DOD SIMWG. According to Mr. Donald "Deke" Forbes, Senior
System Analyst and Military Mishaps Functional Lead and Navy-Marine Corps Subject Matter
Expert (SME) for the SIMWG, the DOD Force Risk Reduction system rolls up the service safety data into standard or common (or what should be standard, based on the policy provided in 2008) data elements for ease of comparison. According to Mr. Forbes, FR2 is a safety collection system only; it simply receives mishap data from the other services. 23 The limited system does not provide users with the ability to search full mishaps reports, create individual ad-hoc queries, conduct detailed comparative analysis, or produce graphs and charts.
THE CHALLENGES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Although the services have similar safety data systems, there is no established crosstalk or data sharing among the service systems other than the minimal push of common mishap data elements to the FR2 system. This data is only a small fraction of the total mishap collected by each service; FR2 does not have the functionality or scope to assist in detailed safety analysis necessary for effective mishap prevention and hazard abatement. The challenge for developing a single, joint-service safety data system is tied to decades of interservice rivalry, parochial thinking, and historically stovepiped development efforts by the services. However, recent policies focused on eliminating redundancy, streamlining IT systems, and leveraging technology to make systems more economical and efficient highlight the way for a joint-service safety data system.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the first formal effort to improve relations between the services and to direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to consider achievement of "maximum effectiveness of the armed forces" in part by considering "unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces" as an avenue to direct change when such duplication exists. 24 Although primarily focused on changing how the services organize, train, and equip their forces, this same guidance is applicable to the duplicative IT systems across the federal government and DOD; and, specifically, to the safety data systems discussed here. 25 This initiative focused on four primary issues: 1) the use of Green IT and reduction of energy and physical footprint of data centers; 2) cost reductions of data center hardware, software, and operations; 3) increased IT security of the government; 4) to shift investments to more efficient computing platforms and technologies. 26 The majority of the safety data systems continue to operate on legacy platforms and technology and need to embrace modernization and efficiency to meet the intent of the FDDCI.
On 6 September 2011, the DOD released the DOD IT Enterprise Strategy Roadmap to address DOD network and infrastructure issues. Teri M. Takai, the DOD CIO stated, "… the incremental and evolutionary manner in which DOD develops information technology (IT) has resulted in layers of stove-piped systems that are difficult to integrate and not as effective as needed." 27 As well as, "Aggressively consolidating now will better position us to embrace emerging technology and provide cutting-edge service to our warfighters. This aggressive consolidation cannot, however, come at the price of degraded capabilities for the warfighter or inflexible commitment to a specific technological solution." 28 The consolidation of the service safety data systems fits nicely into the DOD strategy as these systems provide similar functionality to their users and consolidation would eliminate redundant systems and increase overall data access as well as reporting capabilities for all services.
Additionally, on 8 February 2011, the U.S. CIO released the Federal Cloud Computing Strategy, instituting the "Cloud First" policy: "Following the publication of this strategy, each agency will re-evaluate its technology sourcing strategy to include consideration and application of cloud computing solutions as part of the budget process. Consistent with the Cloud First policy, agencies will modify their IT portfolios to fully take advantage of the benefits of cloud computing in order to maximize capacity utilization, improve IT flexibility and responsiveness, and minimize cost." 29 The elimination of host server farms and associated maintenance requirements for the service safety data systems by migration of these systems to a cloud-based application will save the services and DOD hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars in annual maintenance, hardware refreshment, and manpower costs; consolidation to a single-system would further increase these cost savings.
Coupled with the current fiscal environments of budget and manpower reductions, the DOD and service safety data systems fit neatly into consideration for streamlining and consolidation due to their similar functionality and overall purpose for mishap data collection, trending, and analysis. Although services contend they are unique in their data collection requirements based upon their specific operating environments as well as mission sets, the reality is regardless of how or where a mishap occurs, or a hazard is identified, the functionality of collecting, inputting, trending, and analyzing the data is virtually identical regardless of service.
FUTURE VISION OF CAPABILITIES AND COST EFFECTIVENESS
Baseline comparisons of the services reveals only the AF and Navy are seriously seeking evolutionary improvements in their current safety data systems to meet future needs; but, there are differences. While the AF modifies and updates the AFSAS program to meet current requirements, and to comply with the FDDCI, the Enterprise Strategy Roadmap and the Cloud First policy, the Navy is initiating a full-scale program change via the development of a new Risk Management Information (RMI) system to replace WESS. 30 According to the Navy's "As-Is" analysis to support the RMI development: "Current SOH and risk management systems and processes have not been sufficient in providing the tools required to implement process improvement, reduce mishaps, or lower the cost associated with risk management and mishap loss. As such, the goals and objectives directed by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), DASN (Safety), COMNAVSAFECEN, and CMC SD, will not be achieved without changes to current processes supported by technology." 31 They define root causes for these problems as:
1) Stove-piped capabilities, processes, and data, hinder access to reporting capabilities for daily operational analysis and long term strategic program effectiveness. 2) System limitations restrict reporting capabilities to provide accurate trending analysis to proactively reduce preventable mishaps in all classes.
3) Limited availability of authoritative information regarding Safety Program
Management (SPM) data and all Classes of mishaps, near-misses, and hazards, across the Navy and Marine Corps enterprise, commands, programs and Communities of Interest (COIs).
32
In addition, the analysis provides 18 conditions contributing to problems with their current systems resulting from a lack of focus on proactive mishap prevention capabilities to the inability to conduct advanced analytics with their systems.
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The Navy's "To-Be" analysis highlights four primary High Level Outcomes for the RMI:
1) Improved resource utilization for SOH programs and initiatives.
2) Enterprise-wide SOH trend identification to identify risks and improvements. 
CONCLUSIONS
In today's fiscal environment of ongoing manpower and funding cuts, it is essential for DOD and military leaders to carefully consider where consolidation and leveraging of resources can be made. As discussed, the why, what, and how of mishap data collection is nearly identical across the services, but there is little standardization amongst the safety data systems employed by the services and DOD. Implementation of a joint-service safety data system will help meet the challenges of future development strategies and support the concepts and direction of the Goldwater-Nichols act by reducing duplication of effort, directly support the FDDCI vision for cost reductions of data center hardware, software, and operations, and help implement the DOD IT Enterprise Strategy Roadmap for aggressive IT consolidation, as well as leverage the benefits of Cloud migration and hosting to improve IT flexibility, responsiveness, and overall costs to the services and DOD.
Although each service provides the required capabilities to capture mishap, injury, occupational illness, and hazard data, AFSAS is the only system combining the disciplines within a single, one-stop data system. In addition, the AFSAS requirements and development team has successfully scaled the system to incorporate outside agencies, their specific requirements, and data sets within the current operating budget of the AFSAS program.
Continuous process improvement, and cost effectiveness strategies, are evident in AFSEC's module development efforts, as well as its migration to the commercial Cloud; a first in DOD for this level-3 data security system, and a benchmark for other programs to follow. In addition, its ad-hoc query and business intelligence tools provide users with effective analysis tools, graphing, and report generation capabilities exceeding all other current service systems.
To fully exploit the benefits of AFSAS as the joint-service safety data system, the following recommendations are offered:
• First recommendation: Create a joint program office to oversee the jointservice safety data-collection system and leverage joint-service personnel and funding to support development and quality control requirements for migration of required data from these agencies into the joint system. • Second recommendation: Build comprehensive requirements and functionality into the joint-system to accommodate the data sets and unique differences of the included DOD components and agencies.
• Third recommendation: Develop service team leads to train appropriate personnel with the system prior to use.
• Fourth recommendation: Continue to develop capabilities, and streamline functionality as necessary to meet future DOD component and agency needs.
Effective hazard identification and proactive mishap prevention are essential for saving lives and preserving future combat capability. Ensuring timely safety data collection, trending and analysis capabilities for the DOD components is essential to supporting these efforts. AFSAS is scalable, cost effective, and provides these needed capabilities today. With the proper resourcing and support it will be the premiere joint-safety data system of the future.
